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Abstract
This study examines the e®ects of democratization on the size and composition of govern-
ment expenditure using the data of 125 countries between 1972 and 2010 at most. Speci¯cally,
we focus not only on the total expenditure but also on their composition and employ dichoto-
mous indices of political regimes rather than score indices. Moreover, we construct instruments
for democratization based on the democratization wave and conduct an instrumental variables
estimation to address endogeneity problems. Our results show that while democratization does
not have a signi¯cant impact on total expenditure, it increases expenditure on health and educa-
tion and decreases expenditure on defense. Furthermore, considering the time-varying e®ect of
democratization, defense expenditure starts decreasing immediately after a regime change and
health expenditure increases in the medium and long run, while they do not signi¯cantly vary
before a regime change. Thus, while focusing only on total expenditure does not uncover the
e®ects of democratization, considering detailed categories of government expenditure enables us
to understand how democratization changes governments' behaviors.
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1 Introduction
The \Third Wave of Democratization" (Huntington, 1991) has given birth to a number of newly
democratic countries. In addition, recent years have witnessed various democratization movements
around the world (e.g., the Arab spring in 2010 and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2014).
Democratization or political regime change can largely a®ect subsequent public policies because it
involves various institutional changes including the political process. In order to uncover the e®ect
of democratization on public policies, this study empirically investigates changes in the size and
composition of government expenditure before and after democratization, using a dataset of 125
countries from 1972 to 2010 at most.
While many previous studies examine the e®ect of political regimes on public policies, their
results are not simply comparable because they cover di®erent periods and countries and use dif-
ferent estimation methodologies. Moreover, some earlier works focus on speci¯c expenditure or
policy outcomes, or use the political regime index as one of the additional control variables. Our
study di®ers from them in the following aspects. First, we employ the data on central government
expenditure as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) and speci¯cally consider total expenditure
and six subcategories of expenditure, namely expenditure on health, education, social protection,
defense, economic a®airs, and general public services. Therefore, we examine the comprehensive
and detailed e®ects of democratization on public policies. In addition, by focusing on expenditure
rather than policy outcomes, we can capture the change in a government's behavior after excluding
the e®ects of the e±ciency of its regime and other political factors.1
Second, we use dichotomous indices of political regimes and estimate a di®erence-in-di®erences
model, considering that democratized countries are the treated group and non-reforming countries
are the control group. Most of the previous empirical studies in economics focusing on the e®ects
of political regimes employ a score index of democracy such as the Freedom House measures and
the Polity score. However, using a score index may not be suitable for investigating the e®ects of
regime transition, because it cannot distinguish the e®ects of a regime change from those of the
performance of each regime. Gradstein and Milanovic (2004, p. 516) point out that \quality of
governance or political instability are conceptually di®erent from democracy: they address political
performance of a system, not its inherent (democratic or not) features." Furthermore, they give
an example of countries that have the same polity scores but show di®erences in terms of political
stability.2 Therefore, we mainly analyze the e®ect of permanent democratization, which is de¯ned
as a transition to a democracy without reverse transitions in the sample period.3 This is because
the consolidation of the institutions should be considered in order to investigate the e®ect of regime
1Nelson (2007) points out that democracy increases education and health spending but does not necessarily improve
their outcomes, and that institutional reform in a democracy plays an important role in securing better results.
Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2015) show that democratization can be constrained by various factors such as the elite's
investment in his/her political power, population heterogeneity, and power transfer to the middle class rather than to
the poor. They ¯nd empirical evidence that democratization increases total tax revenues as a share of GDP but has
a limited impact on decline in inequality.
2The de¯nition and the classi¯cation of \political regime" have been controversial topics in political science. See,
for example, Diamond (2002) and Svolik (2012, Chapter 2).
3In this paper, permanent democratization and successful democratization can be used interchangeably.
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transitions. In other words, we focus on the e®ects of the event of democratization given the good
performance/consolidation of the associated institutions.
Third, we carefully address endogeneity problems. In reality, democratization is not a random
event, and thus, it can be correlated with various economic conditions. Moreover, any dichotomous
regime index can be subject to misclassi¯cation, and concerns about omitted variables are common
to most empirical works. In addition, focusing only on permanent democratization can aggravate
endogeneity concerns because a regime index includes information on the future state of institutions,
as pointed out by Acemoglu et al. (2014). To deal with these problems, we employ an instrumental
variables (IV) method. Inspired by Aidt and Jensen (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014), we use the
number of democratizations in neighboring countries as an instrument for democratization.
Finally, we investigate the time-varying e®ects of democratization. Since political regime transi-
tions have a large and broad impact on the whole society, democratization shows both lead and lag ef-
fects, which re°ect individuals' expectations and the consolidation of institutions. Then, these time-
variant e®ects can lead to a non-monotonic relationship between democratization and government
expenditure.4 In addition, our estimation procedure can su®er from misspeci¯cation, as pointed
by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005). Therefore, following Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b), we
divide the periods before and after the regime change into ¯ve subperiods (pre-transition, transi-
tion, short-run democratization, medium-run democratization, and long-run democratization) and
examine the e®ects of democratization in each period. Considering °exible time-varying treatment
e®ects also alleviates the causal problem between democratization and public expenditure.
Our main ¯ndings are as follows. Democratization does not have a signi¯cant impact on total
expenditure. Considering each category of government expenditure, among redistributive policies,
democratization signi¯cantly increases expenditure on health and education, whereas it does not
a®ect expenditure on social protection. Instead, expenditure on defense signi¯cantly decreases after
democratization. Furthermore, considering the timing of democratization, defense expenditure
starts decreasing immediately after the regime change, and health expenditure increases in the
medium and long run. Thus, we ¯nd that an increase in health expenditure due to democratization
takes place relatively slowly. In addition, we show that the expenditure on general public services
decreases in all subperiods.
There is a vast literature on the relationship between public expenditure and political regimes.
Meltzer and Richard (1981), Boix (2003), and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) suggest that democ-
ratization promotes left-wing policies through an extension of franchise to poor citizens. Meanwhile,
Keefer (2007) points out that the majority of new democratic governments from 1975 to 2004 were
right-wing rather than left-wing. His ¯nding indicates that expenditure on left-wing policies such as
health, education, and social protection may not increase after democratization, thus refuting the
above theories. Nevertheless, most of the previous studies show that democracy tends to increase
some social sector spending. Brown and Hunter (1999), Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), and
Avelino et al. (2005) use a dichotomous political regime index developed by Alvarez et al. (1996)
4Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) show the J-curve e®ect of democratization on economic growth; the economy
expands in the pre-transition period, is stagnant in the transition period, and experiences higher growth in the post-
transition period.
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and examine the e®ect of democracy on social spending in Latin American countries. All of them
show a positive relationship between democracy and education spending, and Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo (2001) additionally ¯nd a positive e®ect on health spending and a negative e®ect on social
security spending. Persson and Tabellini (2003) present an attempt to solve these questions, using
a broader panel data set of 60 countries between 1960 and 1998. They ¯nd a positive relationship
between welfare spending and democracy measured by the Gastil index and the Polity score. On
the other hand, Mulligan et al. (2010) conduct a cross-country analysis and show that democracy
does not increase, but decreases, social security expenditure if GDP per capita and population are
controlled.
Expenditure on defense can be a®ected by several factors that are irrelevant to social sector
spending, because military power is an important source of political power inside and outside
the country. For example, particularly in a dictatorship, while military power gives authorities
the ability to repress the masses and neighboring countries, excessive reliance on it empowers the
military, which is a potential political rival of the authorities (Svolik, 2012). Political importance of
military power is generally considered to be larger in a dictatorship than in a democracy, because
a dictatorship does not have formal mechanisms of power transition, and violence is the ultimate
measures to obtain power.5 Therefore, military spending tends to be higher in a dictatorship.
Empirically, previous studies such as Dunne et al. (2008), Albalate et al. (2012), and TÄongÄur et al.
(2015) show a robust negative relationship between the Polity index and military expenditure.
Similar to our study, some earlier works focus on the composition of government expenditure.
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) conduct a cross-country analysis and show that the political regime
does not a®ect ¯scal variables except for aid revenue. Habibi (1994) ¯nds positive e®ects of political
liberty, measured by Gastil's political rights index, on the budget shares of health and social security
and a negative e®ect on that of defense. Moreover, Mulligan et al. (2004) show that higher levels of
democracy decrease military spending but have an insigni¯cant impact on nonmilitary government
consumption, education spending, and social spending. Shelton's (2007) and Profeta et al.'s (2013)
recent studies are closely related. Shelton (2007) comprehensively investigates the determinants of
the size and composition of government expenditure, and employs the political rights index devised
by Freedom House as one of the explanatory variables. Using a dataset covering about 100 countries
from 1970 to 2000, he examines the interaction e®ects of democracy and income inequality and shows
that when evaluated at the mean of the Gini coe±cient, higher political rights increase total and
social security spending and decrease expenditure on public order and safety. The major di®erences
between Shelton's (2007) work and this study are as follows. First, we employ dichotomous indices
of political regimes in order to reveal the e®ect of a regime change. Second, while Shelton (2007)
estimates a random e®ects model to address the measurement error problem, our estimation model
includes country and year ¯xed e®ects to alleviate the omitted variable problem. Using the Polity
score and civil liberty index devised by Freedom House, Profeta et al. (2013) examine the e®ect
of democracy on taxation and public expenditure in developing countries. They ¯nd that the
5This argument implicitly assumes that a democracy is su±ciently consolidated. According to Baliga et al. (2011),
limited democracies, where restrictions on political leaders are not strong, are likely to be more involved in militarized
disputes than in dictatorships.
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relationship between democracy and public spending, except defense expenditure, is insigni¯cant,
if ¯xed e®ects are included. In particular, our study di®ers from that of Profeta et al. (2013) in
terms of the regime index and coverage of countries. Moreover, in contrast with these studies, we
attempt to address the endogeneity of democratization.
Notably, the above empirical studies pay little attention to endogeneity problems. However,
since democratization is an endogenous event, expectation of future ¯scal policies, for example,
can give rise to democratization in the current period, or some unobserved factors can a®ect both
government expenditure and democratization. To the best of our knowledge, Aidt and Jensen (2013)
and Acemoglu et al. (2014) are exceptional studies as they explicitly address the endogeneity of
democratization. Aidt and Jensen (2013) study the rise in social spending in the 19th century and
¯nd a positive relationship between public spending per capita and franchise extension. Built on the
theoretical studies by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), they employ the weighted
sum of the number of revolutionary events in neighboring countries as an instrument. Acemoglu et
al. (2014) examine e®ects of political regime transitions on economic growth using a panel dataset
of 175 countries from 1960 to 2010 and their original dichotomous regime index. Based on the idea
of regional \waves" of democratization, which refers to the spread of democracy from one country
to other countries in a region, their instrument for the political regime is de¯ned as the average
degree of democracy in other countries in the same region whose initial regimes are identical to
that of a given country.6 Inspired by these studies, we construct an instrument for democratization
by summating the number of neighboring democratized countries weighted by the geographical
distance.
Furthermore, Papaioannou and Siourounis' (2008a, 2008b) studies are also closely related to
this paper. Employing Papaioannou and Siourounis' (2008a) new dataset of permanent democrati-
zation for the period 1960-2005, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) show a positive relationship
between democratization and economic growth. We adopt their regime index and use a similar
estimation methodology to investigate the e®ects of successful democratization on the composi-
tion of government expenditure. Although Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) do not apply IV
techniques, they examine the time-varying e®ect of democratization in order to consider the causal
problems. Following them, this study also conducts a similar analysis and additionally implements
IV estimation.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain our estimation methodology. Section
3 describes the data and explains the construction of the expenditure variables. Section 4 presents
the results of the estimation and robustness checks, and discusses them. Section 5 concludes.
2 Estimation methodology
To examine the e®ects of democratization on the size and composition of government expenditure,
we use the annual data of 125 countries over the period 1972-2010. We estimate an equation speci¯ed
6Empirical evidence for the democratic wave is provided by, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2009).
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as
Government expenditureit = ®Dit + ¯
0Xit + ´t + ui + ²it, (1)
where subscripts i and t represent a country and year, respectively. ´ is a year-speci¯c e®ect, u is a
country-speci¯c e®ect, and ² is an error term. Government expenditure refers to total government
expenditure and various categories of government expenditure as shares of GDP. These variables
are in the natural logarithm. D is democratization, which is a dichotomous variable, and more
speci¯cally, is de¯ned as one in the subsequent years after a country is democratized and zero
otherwise. It is noted that this variable is zero if a country has always had a democratic or autocratic
regime. We explain the de¯nitions and sources of government expenditure and democratization in
more detail in the next section. X encompasses a constant, a dummy for the accrual basis of
accounting, and other control variables, such as real GDP per capita, total population, fraction of
population between the ages 0 to 14 as a share of the total population, fraction of population aged
65 and above as a share of the total population, trade openness de¯ned as the sum of exports and
imports divided by GDP, income inequality, and in°ation. All these control variables, except for
in°ation and a dummy for the accounting system, are in the natural logarithm. GDP per capita
represents the level of economic development in a country. As the literature on Wagner's law (e.g.,
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) shows, economic development in°uences the size and composition of
government expenditure. The e®ects of a larger population on public expenditure are ambiguous,
because more heterogeneous preferences require various public services, and non-rivalness of public
goods decreases per capita cost of public goods provision (Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). Moreover,
larger population shares of young and elderly people can increase health, education, and social
protection expenditure. Trade openness can be positively related with the size of the government,
as pointed out by Rodrik (1998). In the robustness checks, we also control for income inequality
and in°ation, because previous studies ¯nd that these variables are associated with the size of
the government. Meltzer and Richard (1981) show that higher income inequality causes more
redistribution. Brender and Drazen (2013) control for in°ation to examine the e®ect of an election
on the composition of government spending since Brender and Drazen (2008) ¯nd that in°ation
a®ects leadership changes in developed countries. Finally, the data of government expenditure
are measured by cash and accrual bases of accounting, as explained in detail in the next section.
Therefore, following Seiferling (2013), to control for di®erences in accounting systems, we include
a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, which is equal to one if the data of the accrual basis
accounting are used and zero otherwise.
We conduct the ¯xed e®ects estimation, which enables us to control for country-¯xed e®ects
such ethnolinguistic, geographical, and cultural factors. For example, ethnic diversity and climate
conditions, which are almost time-invariant in the sample period, can a®ect the size and composition
of government expenditure. Shelton (2007), who examines the determinants of the composition of
government expenditure, intends to consider measurement errors of government expenditure and
then uses the random e®ects estimation. Because the random e®ects estimation does not control
for country-speci¯c e®ects, he adds various time-invariant explanatory variables such as electoral
systems and ethnic fractionalization. On the other hand, we consider that addressing country-
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speci¯c e®ects is more important in a country-level panel data analysis, and thus, we employ a ¯xed
e®ects estimation.
Our estimation model is a di®erence-in-di®erences model like the one used by Papaioannou
and Siourounis (2008b). The treated group is democratization countries and the control group is
non-reforming countries, which include countries that have always been democratic and those that
have always been autocratic. The di®erence-in-di®erences model of democratization has several
concerns; in particular, the democratization variable should be strictly exogenous for the estimator
to be unbiased. If democratization is likely to occur when the size and composition of government
expenditure show some trends, the coe±cient of the democratization variable re°ects those trends
and can be biased upwards or downwards. Therefore, we conduct an IV estimation to tackle
endogeneity problems. In addition, we also examine time-varying e®ects of democratization on
the government budget to deal with the concerns pointed out by Laporte and Windmeijer (2005).
Finally, to address the downward bias of the di®erence-in-di®erences estimators, we employ adjusted
standard errors allowing for country-level heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, following Bertrand
et al. (2004).
3 Data
The data used in this study are drawn from various databases and several previous papers. De-
pending upon the availability of datasets, we collected the annual data of 125 countries over the
period 1972-2010. The countries in our sample are listed in Table A1 of the Appendix.
The data of government expenditure are obtained from the Historical Government Finance
Statistics (GFS) CD-ROM provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005) and the
Government Finance Statistics CD-ROM (IMF, 2013). The Historical GFS is constructed according
to the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 1986 and provides the data from 1972 to
1989. On the other hand, the GFS is based on GFSM 2001 and covers the data from 1990 onwards.
Because GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 have di®erent methodologies, these two databases are not
easily merged together.7 Therefore, we follow Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) to merge
these two databases in order to obtain a longer panel dataset of government expenditure.
We face four main concerns while merging the two databases. First, the classi¯cations of the
Historical GFS and GFS are di®erent; more speci¯cally, the former has 14 categories, and the
latter, 10. Wickens (2002) explains how one may reclassify GFSM 1986 classi¯cation categories as
GFSM 2001 categories. Following Wickens (2002), we convert the data of the Historical GFS to
the classi¯cation categories in GFSM 2001. Then, we can use ten functional categories in GFSM
2001: (1) general public services, (2) defense, (3) public order and safety, (4) economic a®airs, (5)
environmental protection, (6) housing and community amenities, (7) health, (8) recreation, culture,
and religion, (9) education, and (10) social protection. Among them, we focus on total expenditure
and the following six subcategories, which are likely to be related to democratization: expenditure on
health, education, social protection, defense, economic a®airs, and general public services. Second,
7Wickens (2002) describes the di®erences between these two databases in more detail.
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GFSM 1986 and GFSM 2001 have di®erent accounting bases. The former reports a cash basis,
whereas the latter mainly reports an accrual basis. Regarding this concern, Seiferling (2013, p.
9) states, \Although there does not exist a technically sophisticated method for converting cash
data to accrual (or vice versa), for practical purposes, it is acceptable to merge these data for most
series and include a dummy variable in parametric analysis to control for any systematic di®erences
that may exist." Following his argument, we include a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting.
In addition, for countries that report both accounting bases within a given year in the GFS, we
use the data based on the accrual basis. Third, while the Historical GFS provides the data of
consolidated central governments only, the GFS additionally provides the data of the consolidated
general governments. To ensure consistency in this study, we use the data of the consolidated
central governments for both databases.8 Finally, although the GFS includes the data as a share of
GDP, the Historical GFS does not. Therefore, GDP data before 1989 are obtained from the World
Economic Outlook Databases constructed by the IMF (1999).
The data of democratization are obtained from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a), Cheibub
et al. (2010), and Acemoglu et al. (2014). Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) and Acemoglu
et al. (2014) focus on the democratization of 174 countries over the period 1960-2005 and 183
countries over the period 1960-2010, respectively. While Acemoglu et al. (2014) construct the data
referring to Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a), these two data are notably di®erent, one of the
major di®erences being that Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) focus on the permanent changes
to a democratic regime, whereas Acemoglu et al. (2014) examine all transitions to democracy and
reversals. Since we account for the consolidation of democracy, as described above, we mainly use the
democratization data constructed by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) as they are. Furthermore,
they classify democratization into \full," \partial," and \borderline" democratization, using the
Polity and Freedom House indicators. They de¯ne full democratization, partial democratization,
and borderline democratization as democratization where democratic institutions have been fully
consolidated, substantial democratic progress has occurred, and democratic progress has taken place
but the protection of civil liberties is still very poor, respectively. In addition, they consider reversals
from democracy to autocracy. Examining 174 countries, they identify 39 full, 24 partial, 6 borderline
democratizations, and 3 reversals. Among 122 countries in our sample when we use Papaioannou
and Siourounis' (2008a) data, there are 34 full, 17 partial, 6 borderline democratizations, and 2
reversals. Unless otherwise noted, we regard democratization as full democratization. The data
constructed by Cheibub et al. (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) and the detailed classi¯cation
of democratization by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) are employed in the robustness checks.
We list countries and their democratization years in Table A1 of the Appendix.
The data of other control variables such as GDP per capita, total population, fraction of pop-
ulation between ages 0 to 14 as a share of the total population, fraction of population aged 65
and above as a share of the total population, trade openness, and in°ation are obtained from the
World Development Indicators provided by the World Bank (2014). Finally, income inequality,
8We do not consider the di®erence of ¯scal decentralization across countries, because the data on local governments
are limited, and the sample size becomes too small.
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which is the Gini coe±cient of household income, is taken from Solt's (2009) study.9 Table A2 of
the Appendix summarizes data de¯nitions and sources, and Table A3 of the Appendix shows the
descriptive statistics.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Basic results
Table 1 presents our basic estimation results, in which we regard democratization as full democ-
ratization, as de¯ned by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a). We use the data of 122 countries
over the period 1972-2005. In column (1), the coe±cient of democratization on total government
expenditure as a share of GDP is not signi¯cant. Next, we examine whether the government con-
ducts speci¯c redistributive policies after democratization. In columns (2)-(4), we consider the
health, education, and social protection expenditure divided by GDP. Among them, only health
expenditure signi¯cantly increases after democratization, in line with the predictions of the models
µa la Meltzer and Richard (1981). Column (5) indicates that democratization decreases military
spending, which is similar to the previous studies.10 A good example of this result is the case of
Chile between 1973 and 1989, which was ruled by the military junta headed by Augusto Pinochet.
In this period, the maximum value of military expenditure was 4.15% in 1974. Military expenditure
decreased after democratization in 1990 and reached 0.96% in 2008. The Republic of Korea (South
Korea) also ¯ts this scenario. After World War II, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan governed
South Korea via military dictatorship. While military expenditure was 5.94% in 1981, it decreased
after democratization and fell to 2.22% in 2002. Columns (6) and (7) show that democratization
negatively impacts expenditure on economic a®airs and general public services, but these e®ects are
not signi¯cant.
[Table 1 here]
In Table 2, we control for inequality and in°ation. Despite controlling for these variables,
we obtain the same results as in Table 1, that is, democratization signi¯cantly increases health
expenditure and decreases defense expenditure.11
[Table 2 here]
9We employ the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (Version 4.0) developed by Solt (2009).
10The expenditure on defense can be a®ected by wars. We also control for a dummy variable for war, which
equals one if there are at least 1000 battle-related deaths and zero otherwise. This variable is constructed using
the UCDP/PRIO Armed Con°ict Dataset v.4-2014a, 1946-2013, which is provided by Gleditsch et al. (2002) and
Themn¶er and Wallensteen (2014). The results remain unchanged even if we include this dummy variable.
11We conduct the same regression analyses, using government expenditure as a share of total government expenditure
instead of as a share of GDP. As explained in section 3, we merge the data measured by the cash and accrual bases of
accounting. If we use government expenditure as a share of total government expenditure, the di®erences between the
accounting bases seem to be less of a problem. In this analysis, as in Table 1, democratization signi¯cantly increases
health expenditure and decreases defense expenditure. In addition, educational expenditure signi¯cantly increases
after democratization.
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4.2 Alternative democratization indices
In this section, we use two di®erent indices of democratization in order to con¯rm the robustness
of the results. We construct the data pertaining to successful democratization based on Acemoglu
et al. (2014) in the following manner. We de¯ne an index of successful democratization as one that
meets the following conditions: (1) the country's democratization is the most recent in the sample
period and, (2) its ¯nal democratic regime had persisted at least for ¯ve years until the end of the
sample period. Cheibub et al. (2010) provide the minimalist dichotomous measure of democracy
and dictatorship covering 199 countries from 1946 to 2008.12 Applying the same two conditions, we
also create an index of successful democratization based on the dataset constructed by Cheibub et
al. (2010).
First, Table 3 provides the estimation results when we employ successful democratization based
on the data of Acemoglu et al. (2014). The dataset includes 125 countries between 1972 and 2010.
As in Tables 1 and 2, democratization has a signi¯cantly positive impact on health expenditure and
a signi¯cantly negative e®ect on defense expenditure. In addition, in column (6), democratization
signi¯cantly decreases expenditure on economic a®airs.
[Table 3 here]
Second, Table 4 shows the estimation results when we use successful democratization based on
the data by Cheibub et al. (2010). We use the data of 124 countries over the period 1972-2008.
Then, only health expenditure signi¯cantly increases after democratization, as seen in column (3).
The measure of political regime by Cheibub et al. (2010) is based on a minimalist approach, and the
number of democratized countries is fewer than that of two other measures. For example, Estonia
and Ukraine have always been democratic since independence, while Papaioannou and Siourounis
(2008a) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) consider that these countries democratized in 1992 and 1994,
respectively. These di®erences seem to cause somewhat di®erent estimation results compared with
the cases of two other democratization indices.
[Table 4 here]
4.3 Instrumental variables estimation
In this section, we conduct a panel IV estimation to address endogeneity problems. Motivated by
Aidt and Jensen (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014), we construct the instruments for democrati-
12Similar to Alvarez et al. (1996), Cheibub et al. (2010) simply de¯ne a democracy if a country satis¯es the
following two conditions: (1) both the chief executive o±ce and the legislative body must be ¯lled by elections, and
(2) contestation occurs when there exists an opposition that has some chance of winning o±ce as a consequence of
elections.
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zation as follows.13
Zit =
( P
j 6=i
1
Nt¡1
³
1¡ ±ij±
´
Djt if Sit = 0,
0 if Sit = 1,
(2)
where ±ij is the time-invariant great-circle distance between the capitals of countries i and j, ± is
half the length of the equator, and Nt is the number of countries in the world. Sit is zero if a
country is autocratic and one if it is democratic. Djt is a democratization variable as in Eq. (1)
and its construction is based on 39 full democratization episodes as in Papaioannou and Siourounis'
(2008a) study. When constructing the instrument, we use 174 countries, all of which are included
in the dataset provided by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a). The data pertaining to distance
are drawn from Mayer and Zignago's (2011) study.
Our identi¯cation strategy is that democratization is a®ected by (exogenous) democratization in
other countries. Since democratization occurs only in dictatorial countries, the instrument takes zero
when a country is a democratic, and the instrument is a®ected by democratization in other countries
all over the world. In the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), many countries in Latin
America were democratized in the 1980s, and many countries in Eastern Europe and Africa were
democratized in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, democratization in
other countries is unlikely to in°uence government behavior directly. Therefore, our constructed IV
for democratization are valid in that the instruments are highly correlated with democratization in
a given country and do not directly in°uence the dependent variable. Because the democratization
wave seems to a®ect political regimes after a certain period of time, we use the ¯rst, second, and
third lags of Z as the instruments for democratization.
Table 5 shows the panel IV estimation results. We ¯rst con¯rm the validity of the instruments
from the statistical viewpoint. In all columns, the F -values for the tests of the excluded instruments
in the ¯rst-stage regressions exceed 10, satisfying the \rule of thumb" proposed by Staiger and Stock
(1997). Moreover, the Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions do not reject the orthogonality
conditions at the conventional signi¯cance level in all columns.
[Table 5 here]
The results in Table 5 are similar to those in Tables 1 and 2; democratization signi¯cantly
increases health expenditure and decreases defense expenditure. A notable di®erence is that de-
mocratization also has a signi¯cant positive impact on educational expenditure, as seen in column
(3).
4.4 Time-varying e®ects
The e®ects of democratization on the composition of government expenditure may not be monotonic.
For example, dictatorships facing the threat of democratization may increase armaments to suppress
13Acemoglu et al. (2014) consider that the democratization wave occurs in the same region. On the other hand, we
think that democratization in a country is a®ected by democratization in other countries in the world, and the extent
of this e®ect is inversely proportional to the distances between the countries. Persson and Tabellini (2009) and Aidt
and Jensen (2013) also adopt this type of weight as in°uences from foreign countries.
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their citizens, while military expenditure decreases after democratization. Furthermore, Laporte
and Windmeijer (2005) point out that ¯xed e®ects estimators with binary indicator variables can
su®er from misspeci¯cation when treatment e®ects are not constant over time. To address this
concern, they propose that we should use °exible time-varying treatment e®ects. Therefore, we
follow Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b) and examine the timing of the e®ect of democratization.
Speci¯cally, we estimate the following equation.
Government expenditureit = ®1D
1
it + ®2D
2
it + ®3D
3
it + ®4D
4
it + ®5D
5
it
+ ¯0Xit + ´t + ui + ²it. (3)
Consider that a country is democratized when t = T . D1 is de¯ned as one if t = T ¡5, T ¡4, T ¡3;
D2 is de¯ned as one if t = T ¡ 2, T ¡ 1, T ; D3 is de¯ned as one if t = T + 1, T + 2, T + 3; D4 is
de¯ned as one if t = T + 4, T + 5, T + 6; and D5 is de¯ned as one if t ¸ T + 7. All these dummy
variables are equal to zero in the years that are not speci¯ed.
Table 6 shows the estimation results. As shown below in detail, we do not ¯nd a non-monotonic
relationship between democratization and expenditure. In column (1), democratization does not
have a signi¯cant impact on total government expenditure in all periods around the transition. In
column (2), the expenditure on health increases in the medium and long run, and its impact is larger
in the long run. In columns (3) and (4), the expenditure on education and social protection do not
change for any timing of democratization. In column (5), the expenditure on defense decreases
immediately after democratization, and its impacts are larger in the medium and long run. De-
mocratization does not have a signi¯cant impact on the expenditure on economic a®airs, as seen in
column (6). In column (7), the expenditure on general public services decreases through all periods.
This result di®ers from those in Tables 1 and 2, and classifying the timings of democratization can
capture the di®erent e®ects on the expenditure on general public services.
[Table 6 here]
4.5 Di®erent types of transitions
In this section, we examine the di®erent e®ects depending on the types of democratization. We
employ Papaioannou and Siourounis' (2008a) four classi¯cations of political regime transitions,
namely full, partial, and borderline democratizations, and reversals, and we simultaneously include
these dummy variables in the regression equation. This analysis not only serves as a robustness
check for the results obtained so far but also investigates how incomplete democratization and
reverse transition change governments' behaviors.14
In all columns, the coe±cients and signi¯cances of full democratization are almost the same as
in Tables 1 and 2. In contrast, partial democratization has a positive e®ect only on the expenditure
14Since the end of the Cold War, most of the countries practicing dictatorship have nominally adopted democratic
political institutions (Diamond, 2002) and thus, have become partially democratized. All the countries classi¯ed as
partially democratized by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a) were democratized in the 1990s, except for Serbia and
Montenegro and Turkey.
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on general public services (see column (8)). These results suggest that the e®ect of partial democra-
tization on government expenditure is quite di®erent from that of full democratization. Borderline
democratization has a negative impact on expenditure on health, education, and general public ser-
vices (see columns (2), (3), and (7), respectively), whereas it has a positive impact on expenditure
on social protection, as seen in column (4). Moreover, the reverse transition from a democracy to
a dictatorship increases total expenditure (see column (1)) and expenditure on social protection
(see column (4)). If the reverse transition gives rise to e®ects opposite to those of democratization,
the sign of coe±cient of the reversals dummy should be opposite to that of (full) democratization.
Thus, our results seem to be inconsistent. Because our sample includes only two countries that
have undergone reversal, Gambia and Zimbabwe, it is di±cult to judge whether the results re°ect
the political events in these two countries over a period or if they are generalized (i.e., apply to
all reversals).15 The same caveat also applies to the results for borderline democratization because
only six countries are classi¯ed as such in our sample.
[Table 7 here]
4.6 Discussion
In this section, we summarize the results obtained so far and discuss them. Our estimation results
show that democratization has no signi¯cant impact on total government expenditure as a share of
GDP. On the other hand, considering speci¯c categories of government expenditure, we ¯nd that
the expenditure on health and education signi¯cantly increases after democratization. These results
concerning redistributive policies are largely consistent with the consequences of the democratization
models based on Meltzer and Richard (1981), whereas the e®ect on social protection expenditure
is insigni¯cant. Moreover, our results show a decrease in the expenditure on defense. A decline in
military spending after democratization is consistent with the previous empirical studies that use
score regime indices (Dunne et al., 2008; Albalate et al., 2012; TÄongÄur et al., 2015).
When considering the time-varying e®ects of democratization, both changes in expenditure on
health and defense are observed only after regime transition. In particular, the increase in health
expenditure becomes gradually larger in the medium and long run. This suggests that dictatorships
may not signi¯cantly change their policies regarding health and military spending even if they expect
democratization, and that redistributive policies are implemented as democracy is consolidated.
Furthermore, we also ¯nd that democratization signi¯cantly decreases the expenditure on general
public services before and after regime transition. The interpretation of this result is somewhat
di±cult, but this may re°ect the chaos in general governmental functions in the midst of a regime
transition, given that the expenditure on general public services includes expenses for ¯nancial and
¯scal a®airs and diplomacy.16
15An increase in total expenditure in countries classi¯ed under the category \reversals" may especially re°ect the
events in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe witnessed a reversal in 1987. Its total government expenditure as a share of GDP
was 29.70% in 1986 and increased to 40.34% in 1996.
16As a further check, we estimate Eq. (3) after replacing dummy D5 with two new dummies, D6 and D7, which
are respectively de¯ned as one if t = T +7, T +8, T +9 and if t ¸ T +10. Then, the coe±cient of D7 is insigni¯cant,
while D2, D3, D4, and D6 have signi¯cant negative impacts. This result suggests that the e®ect of democratization
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Furthermore, focusing on various types of democratization, partial democratization a®ects the
government expenditure di®erently from full (permanent) democratization. Speci¯cally, partial
democratization increases the expenditure on general public services only. This ¯nding suggests
that partially democratized countries, most of which are former socialist and African countries
democratized in the 1990s, may hardly change their policies even after democratization.17
Overall, focusing only on total expenditure does not allow us to uncover the change in gov-
ernments' behaviors after democratization. However, considering detailed categories of government
expenditure enables us to understand how democratization a®ects governments' behaviors. That is,
while democratization increases some social sector spending, it simultaneously decreases the expen-
diture on defense. As a result, the size of government expenditure does not seem to be in°uenced
by democratization.
5 Concluding remarks
More countries have become democratic in recent times. Thus, it has become more important to
investigate how political regime changes in°uence subsequent public policies. Using the data of
125 countries between 1972 and 2010 at most, this study examines how democratization a®ects
the size and composition of government expenditure. To reveal the detailed changes pertaining to
democratization in governments' behaviors, we focus on six subcategories of expenditure, namely
health, education, social protection, defense, economic a®airs, and general public services, and total
expenditure. In addition, we construct the IV for democratization based on historical events of
the democratization wave to deal with the endogeneity of democratization. Our results show that
while democratization does not have a signi¯cant impact on total expenditure, it has signi¯cant
impacts on certain subcategories of expenditure. Among redistributive policies, democratization
signi¯cantly increases expenditure on health and education, although it does not a®ect expenditure
on social protection. Instead, expenditure on defense signi¯cantly decreases after democratization.
Furthermore, considering the timing of democratization, defense expenditure starts decreasing im-
mediately after a regime change and health expenditure increases in the medium and long run,
while these types of expenditure do not signi¯cantly change before a regime change. We also show
that the expenditure on general public services decreases in all subperiods.
This study uses dichotomous measures and focuses on successful democratization. While our
approach can capture the e®ect of a regime change given the quality of institutions, the scope of a
political regime and its transition is not broad. Although we investigate the e®ects of various types
of democratization in section 4.5, the analyses on incomplete democratization and reverse transition
may not be su±cient because countries that are not fully democratized and non-democracies can take
various forms. In particular, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many dictatorial countries are
likely to mimic democracies, and this tendency is fostered by increasing international intervention in
on the expenditure on general public services is transitory rather than permanent. This may also explain why the
negative e®ect on the expenditure on general public services is insigni¯cant in the other analyses.
17This result is similar to the e®ect of democratization on economic growth. Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008b)
show that partial democratization does not have a signi¯cant positive e®ect on growth.
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non-democracies (Diamond, 2002). In order to examine the recent global wave of democratization,
we should obtain a more rich understanding of regime types and transition mechanisms. These are
important and interesting topics for future research, both in the empirical and theoretical sense.
Appendix
See Tables A1-A3.
[Table A1 here]
[Table A2 here]
[Table A3 here]
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Table 1: Basic results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Democratization -0.029 0.388*** 0.182 -0.044 -0.256*** -0.075 -0.199
(0.050) (0.138) (0.136) (0.081) (0.071) (0.108) (0.143)
GDP per capita -0.044 -0.175 0.076 -0.030 -0.150 0.375** -0.327
(0.072) (0.210) (0.138) (0.163) (0.154) (0.148) (0.204)
Population -0.306** 0.584 -0.170 -0.194 -0.378 -0.593* -0.630
(0.138) (0.484) (0.319) (0.295) (0.323) (0.338) (0.416)
Fraction 14- 0.258 -0.911 0.706 -0.152 -0.120 0.911** -0.445
(0.202) (0.689) (0.588) (0.434) (0.351) (0.385) (0.540)
Fraction 65+ 0.196 -0.605* 0.028 0.749* 0.342 1.069*** -0.376
(0.164) (0.359) (0.228) (0.410) (0.359) (0.370) (0.447)
Trade openness 0.119* 0.094 -0.134* -0.086 0.074 0.241* 0.432***
(0.064) (0.112) (0.079) (0.114) (0.140) (0.132) (0.124)
Countries 122 110 110 109 107 109 110
Observations 2355 1890 1900 1824 1778 1834 1871
Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term,
year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 2: Extended results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Democratization -0.021 0.381*** 0.255 -0.003 -0.285*** 0.017 -0.135
(0.047) (0.133) (0.155) (0.100) (0.083) (0.126) (0.143)
GDP per capita -0.123* -0.218 0.016 -0.186 -0.173 0.581*** -0.414*
(0.072) (0.244) (0.187) (0.174) (0.158) (0.186) (0.216)
Population -0.294* 0.833* -0.183 0.021 -0.510 -0.459 -1.211***
(0.160) (0.466) (0.389) (0.305) (0.323) (0.353) (0.376)
Fraction 14- 0.091 -0.983 0.711 -0.162 0.042 0.783* 0.025
(0.200) (0.660) (0.728) (0.472) (0.433) (0.442) (0.647)
Fraction 65+ 0.371** -0.514 0.237 1.016** 0.822** 0.873** 0.331
(0.164) (0.470) (0.244) (0.414) (0.390) (0.384) (0.572)
Trade openness 0.062 0.058 -0.179** -0.042 0.008 0.093 0.411***
(0.053) (0.123) (0.084) (0.101) (0.112) (0.115) (0.125)
Inequality -0.010 0.773** 0.297 -0.113 -0.230 -0.280 -0.165
(0.109) (0.344) (0.236) (0.237) (0.166) (0.248) (0.254)
In°ation -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Countries 104 91 91 89 89 91 91
Observations 1798 1450 1455 1400 1394 1407 1444
Notes: All variables except democratization and in°ation are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a
constant term, year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results
here. ***, **, and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are
robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 3: Frist alterative democratization index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Democratization -0.000 0.302** 0.120 -0.008 -0.212*** -0.229** -0.026
(0.050) (0.148) (0.134) (0.093) (0.063) (0.114) (0.159)
GDP per capita -0.025 0.057 0.245 -0.023 -0.099 0.417*** -0.329*
(0.063) (0.231) (0.153) (0.149) (0.142) (0.148) (0.192)
Population -0.133 0.485 -0.034 0.188 -0.300 -0.441 -0.622
(0.131) (0.468) (0.332) (0.318) (0.298) (0.311) (0.380)
Fraction 14- 0.080 -0.895 0.480 -0.266 -0.253 0.479 -0.345
(0.198) (0.591) (0.651) (0.411) (0.348) (0.377) (0.508)
Fraction 65+ 0.076 -0.574* -0.053 0.916** 0.125 0.707** -0.316
(0.147) (0.345) (0.253) (0.383) (0.334) (0.323) (0.411)
Trade openness 0.093 0.041 -0.154* -0.054 0.016 0.225** 0.380***
(0.063) (0.112) (0.091) (0.118) (0.136) (0.113) (0.118)
Countries 125 112 112 111 109 111 112
Observations 2736 2147 2156 2070 2029 2088 2130
Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term,
year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 4: Second alterative democratization index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Democratization 0.029 0.283* 0.132 0.007 -0.057 -0.147 -0.036
(0.052) (0.147) (0.131) (0.092) (0.111) (0.115) (0.159)
GDP per capita -0.037 -0.024 0.177 -0.041 -0.112 0.381*** -0.330*
(0.063) (0.226) (0.144) (0.155) (0.148) (0.144) (0.199)
Population -0.191 0.502 -0.126 0.012 -0.327 -0.475 -0.606
(0.130) (0.479) (0.327) (0.293) (0.304) (0.333) (0.389)
Fraction 14- 0.140 -0.943 0.633 -0.227 -0.205 0.607 -0.316
(0.200) (0.611) (0.633) (0.421) (0.343) (0.382) (0.523)
Fraction 65+ 0.101 -0.472 0.048 0.825** 0.054 0.834** -0.345
(0.149) (0.358) (0.230) (0.397) (0.360) (0.352) (0.425)
Trade openness 0.103 0.067 -0.141 -0.077 0.031 0.219* 0.396***
(0.064) (0.115) (0.092) (0.112) (0.135) (0.119) (0.119)
Countries 124 112 112 111 109 111 112
Observations 2588 2046 2056 1973 1931 1988 2029
Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term,
year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 5: IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Democratization 0.043 0.354* 0.298* -0.115 -0.500** 0.056 -0.148
(0.082) (0.193) (0.174) (0.247) (0.195) (0.190) (0.210)
GDP per capita -0.053 -0.141 0.066 -0.100 -0.062 0.472*** -0.347
(0.060) (0.218) (0.142) (0.153) (0.149) (0.149) (0.213)
Population -0.313** 0.384 -0.353 -0.208 -0.451 -0.756** -0.571
(0.143) (0.451) (0.343) (0.379) (0.325) (0.382) (0.402)
Fraction 14- 0.286 -0.782 0.869 -0.313 -0.045 1.025** -0.367
(0.191) (0.684) (0.589) (0.447) (0.382) (0.398) (0.580)
Fraction 65+ 0.194 -0.559 0.034 0.673* 0.498 1.121*** -0.359
(0.163) (0.376) (0.241) (0.408) (0.368) (0.395) (0.502)
Trade openness 0.088 0.082 -0.200*** -0.079 0.054 0.191 0.390***
(0.055) (0.106) (0.068) (0.117) (0.124) (0.121) (0.120)
F-value in the ¯rst stage 23.49 19.38 20.23 21.52 15.77 21.47 20.54
Hansen test (p-value) 0.12 0.12 0.76 0.32 0.64 0.19 0.17
Countries 113 103 104 102 100 103 103
Observations 2163 1741 1750 1676 1638 1690 1721
Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term,
year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. The
instruments for democratization are the ¯rst, second, and third lags of the constructed instruments, Z. ***, **, and *
indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors
clustered at the country level.
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Table 6: Time-varying e®ects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Pre democratization -0.039 -0.075 0.057 0.007 0.089 -0.053 -0.311*
(0.065) (0.114) (0.096) (0.064) (0.104) (0.081) (0.183)
Transition -0.099 -0.105 -0.023 -0.025 -0.052 -0.087 -0.456***
(0.070) (0.116) (0.154) (0.090) (0.115) (0.086) (0.144)
Short-run democratization -0.094 0.172 0.233 -0.025 -0.205* -0.156 -0.447***
(0.070) (0.139) (0.190) (0.112) (0.115) (0.112) (0.161)
Medium-run democratization -0.101 0.296* 0.193 -0.040 -0.273*** -0.131 -0.491**
(0.079) (0.156) (0.194) (0.121) (0.100) (0.119) (0.200)
Long-run democratization -0.018 0.542*** 0.199 -0.097 -0.270** -0.067 -0.375*
(0.077) (0.193) (0.202) (0.131) (0.115) (0.125) (0.202)
GDP per capita -0.031 -0.116 0.081 -0.037 -0.163 0.391** -0.271
(0.072) (0.205) (0.139) (0.162) (0.157) (0.152) (0.204)
Population -0.276* 0.707 -0.164 -0.211 -0.406 -0.561 -0.543
(0.140) (0.467) (0.327) (0.300) (0.327) (0.342) (0.416)
Fraction 14- 0.279 -0.757 0.717 -0.181 -0.144 0.933** -0.473
(0.204) (0.631) (0.593) (0.433) (0.353) (0.389) (0.508)
Fraction 65+ 0.170 -0.740** 0.023 0.781* 0.368 1.043*** -0.400
(0.166) (0.373) (0.229) (0.407) (0.345) (0.369) (0.455)
Trade openness 0.117* 0.083 -0.131 -0.078 0.073 0.240* 0.456***
(0.066) (0.111) (0.079) (0.114) (0.141) (0.134) (0.128)
Countries 122 110 110 109 107 109 110
Observations 2355 1890 1900 1824 1778 1834 1871
Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term,
year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered at the country level.
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Table 7: All types of transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total Health Education Social Defense Economic General
protection a®airs public
services
Full democratization -0.022 0.377*** 0.171 -0.030 -0.255*** -0.074 -0.201
(0.050) (0.137) (0.134) (0.082) (0.069) (0.106) (0.139)
Partial democratization 0.081 -0.113 -0.043 0.086 0.026 -0.236 0.444**
(0.125) (0.164) (0.167) (0.175) (0.145) (0.306) (0.171)
Borderline democratization 0.103 -0.353** -0.469*** 0.479*** 0.067 0.307** -0.647***
(0.135) (0.154) (0.132) (0.130) (0.149) (0.142) (0.150)
Reversals 0.087** -0.038 0.065 0.247** -0.131 -0.055 0.121
(0.033) (0.090) (0.072) (0.114) (0.096) (0.087) (0.114)
GDP per capita -0.040 -0.216 0.036 0.021 -0.144 0.375** -0.334*
(0.073) (0.219) (0.142) (0.161) (0.174) (0.164) (0.185)
Population -0.345** 0.662 -0.099 -0.295 -0.385 -0.582* -0.640
(0.137) (0.491) (0.327) (0.297) (0.357) (0.349) (0.418)
Fraction 14- 0.278 -1.005 0.598 -0.021 -0.108 0.975** -0.555
(0.204) (0.707) (0.606) (0.423) (0.365) (0.410) (0.558)
Fraction 65+ 0.213 -0.622* 0.028 0.770* 0.341 1.028*** -0.298
(0.159) (0.371) (0.232) (0.409) (0.358) (0.379) (0.448)
Trade openness 0.112* 0.103 -0.136* -0.097 0.075 0.277** 0.369***
(0.059) (0.118) (0.081) (0.114) (0.139) (0.113) (0.106)
Countries 122 110 110 109 107 109 110
Observations 2355 1890 1900 1824 1778 1834 1871
Notes: All variables except democratization are in the natural logarithm. All estimations include a constant term,
year dummies, and a dummy for the accrual basis of accounting, although we do not report the results here. ***, **,
and * indicate the 1%, 5%, and 10% signi¯cance levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors clustered at the country level.
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Table A1: List of countries
Main Frist Second Main Frist Second
alternative alternative alternative alternative
Afghanistan* Congo, Rep.
Albania 1992 (P) 1997 1991 Costa Rica
Argentina 1983 (F) 1983 1983 Cote d'Ivoire
Armenia 1998 (P) 1998 Croatia 2000 (F) 2000
Australia Cyprus 1974 1983
Austria Czech Republic 1993 (F) 1993
Azerbaijan Denmark
Bahamas, The Dominican Republic 1978 (F) 1978
Bahrain Egypt, Arab Rep.
Bangladesh 1991 (P) El Salvador 1994 (F) 1982 1984
Barbados Estonia 1992 (F) 1992
Belarus Ethiopia 1995 (P)
Belgium Finland
Benin 1991 (F) 1991 1991 France
Bhutan Gabon
Bolivia 1982 (F) 1982 1982 Gambia, The 1994 (R)
Bosnia and Herzegovina Georgia 1995 (P) 1995 2004
Brazil 1985 (F) 1985 1985 Germany
Bulgaria 1991 (F) 1991 1990 Ghana* 1996 (F) 1996 1993
Burkina Faso Greece 1975 (F) 1975 1974
Burundi 2003 Guinea
Cabo Verde 1991 (F) 1991 1990 Guyana 1992 (F) 1992
Cambodia Honduras 1982 (F) 1982 1982
Cameroon Hungary 1990 (F) 1990 1990
Canada Iceland
Central African Republic 1993 (B) India
Chad Indonesia 1999 (P) 1999 1999
Chile 1990 (F) 1990 1990 Iran, Islamic Rep. 1997 (B)
China Ireland
Colombia Israel
Comoros 1990 (B) 2002 2004 Italy
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica
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Table A1 (Continued)
Main Frist Second Main Frist Second
alternative alternative alternative alternative
Japan Romania 1990 (F) 1990 1990
Jordan* Russian Federation 1993 (P)
Kazakhstan Rwanda
Korea, Rep. 1988 (F) 1988 1988 Senegal 2000 (F) 2000 2000
Kuwait Seychelles
Latvia 1993 (F) 1993 Singapore
Lesotho 1993 (P) 1999 Slovak Republic 1993 (F) 1993
Liberia 2004 Slovenia 1992 (F) 1992
Lithuania 1993 (F) 1993 South Africa 1994 (F) 1994
Luxembourg Spain 1978 (F) 1978 1977
Macedonia, FYR 1991 (P) 1991 Sri Lanka 1989
Madagascar 1993 (P) 1993 Suriname 1991 (P) 1991 1991
Malaysia Sweden
Mali 1992 (F) 1992 1992 Switzerland
Malta Syrian Arab Republic
Mauritius Tajikistan
Mexico 1997 (F) 1997 2000 Thailand 1992 (F)
Moldova 1994 (P) 1994 Togo
Mongolia 1993 (F) 1993 1990 Tonga
Morocco Trinidad and Tobago
Nepal 1991 (B) 2006 Tunisia
Netherlands Turkey 1983 (P) 1983 1983
New Zealand Ukraine 1994 (P) 1994
Nicaragua 1990 (P) 1990 1984 United Kingdom
Niger 1999 (B) 2000 United States
Norway Uruguay 1985 (F) 1985 1985
Pakistan 1988 (B) Venezuela, RB
Panama 1994 (F) 1994 1989 Zambia 1991 (P) 1991
Paraguay 1993 (P) 1993 1989 Zimbabwe 1987 (R)
Peru 1980 (F) 1993 2001
Poland 1990 (F) 1990 1989
Portugal 1976 (F) 1976 1976
Notes: The numbers refer to the year of democratization. \Main" is based on Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008a)
and (F), (P), (B), and (R) mean full, partial, and borderline democratization, and reversals, respectively. Note that
the three countries (marked with *) are not included among the 122 countries in the main sample. We de¯ne successful
democratization using the data of Cheibub et al. (2010) and Acemoglu et al. (2014). \First and second alternatives"
are based on Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Cheibub et al. (2010), respectively, and are de¯ned as democratization
satisfying the following conditions: (1) the country's democratization is the most recent in the sample period, and (2)
its ¯nal democratic regime had persisted at least for ¯ve years until the end of the sample period.
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Table A2: Data de¯nitions and sources
Variable Description Source
Total Total government expenditure as a share of GDP IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Health Expenditure on health as a share of GDP. Health includes medical
products, appliances and equipment, outpatient services, hospital ser-
vices, public health services, and so on. See GFSM 2001 for a detailed
de¯nition
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Education Expenditure on education as a share of GDP. Education includes pre-
primary, primary, secondary, postsecondary, nontertiary, and tertiary
education, and so on. See GFSM 2001 for a detailed de¯nition
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Social protection Expenditure on social protection as a share of GDP. Social protection
includes protection against sickness and disability, old age, unemploy-
ment, and protection for survivors, family and children, housing, and
so on. See GFSM 2001 for a detailed de¯nition
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Defense Expenditure on defense as a share of GDP. Defense includes military
defense, civil defense, and so on. See GFSM 2001 for a detailed de¯ni-
tion
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
Economic a®airs Expenditure on economic a®airs as a share of GDP. Economic a®airs
include general economic, commercial, and labor a®airs; a®airs pertain-
ing to agriculture, forestry, ¯shing, hunting, fuel and energy, mining,
manufacturing, construction, transport, and communication, and so on.
See GFSM 2001 for a detailed de¯nition
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
General public services Expenditure on general public services as a share of GDP. General
public services include executive and legislative organs, ¯nancial and
¯scal a®airs, external a®airs, foreign economic aid, and so on. See
GFSM 2001 for a detailed de¯nition
IMF (1999, 2005, 2013)
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita in constant 2005 U.S. dollars World Bank (2014)
Population Total population World Bank (2014)
Fraction 14- Fraction of population between the ages 0 and 14 as a share of the total
population
World Bank (2014)
Fraction 65+ Fraction of population aged 65 and above as a share of the total pop-
ulation
World Bank (2014)
Trade openness The sum of exports and imports divided by GDP World Bank (2014)
Inequality Estimate of the Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root
scale) household disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income
Solt (2009)
In°ation In°ation based on the GDP de°ator. World Bank (2014)
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Variables Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Total 2881 29.667 11.767 3.450 156.950
Health 2269 2.500 1.987 0.015 9.910
Education 2278 3.262 1.787 0.150 12.530
Social protection 2192 7.592 6.028 0.011 25.980
Defense 2137 2.632 4.026 0.026 107.040
Economic a®airs 2201 4.959 3.779 0.470 29.588
General public services 2252 7.269 4.334 0.390 62.640
GDP per capita 4353 9183.209 12908.960 50.042 87716.730
Population 4872 37600000 133000000 56068 1340000000
Fraction 14- 4875 32.498 10.588 13.269 50.330
Fraction 65+ 4875 7.311 4.577 1.349 22.962
Trade openness 4296 76.617 48.046 6.320 439.657
Inequality 3281 37.060 10.676 15.370 75.256
In°ation 4366 53.026 600.947 -29.173 26762.020
Notes: These statistics are calculated based on 125 countries over the period 1972-2010.
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